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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

VEIGH CUMMINGS and JoELLEN
CUl\iMINGS, his wif~,
Platn.tiffs and Appellants,
-vs.J.

ELMO ENGLAND, DeLOYD
ENGLAND, AND BOYD ENGLAND, A partnership, doing business under the name and style of
ENGLAND BROTHERS,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 9344

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set forth in opponents' brief are incomplete.
For this reason, respondents believe it would be helpful
to set forth a chronological statement of the occurrences
here in question.
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In the month of :March, 1958 (Exhibit 28-D), the
plaintiff, VEIGH CuMMINGs, on behalf of appellants,
and J. ELMO EN;~LAND,; on behalf ?f respondents, began efforts to consummate an arrangement concerning
a ranch located in Summit County which the respondents
were purchasing from Y ern

~fills

and Kenneth :Mills

under a uniform real estate contract dated October 1, 1948
(Exhibit 5-P), but the agreen1ent, which is the subject
matter of this lawsuit and which was prepared by Earl
~1.

M:arshall, Attorney and Judge of· Tooele City, was

not executed until M:ay 7, 1958 (R. 214 and Exhibit 7-P).
It should be noted that

~fr.

Cummings' contract, ho:wever,

had the date of J\farch 26, 1958, filled in alihough no one
seemed to know who had done this (Exhibit 6-P, R. 108,
R. 214). At the

ti:r~e

the agreements were signed,

~Ir.

Cummings had sheep as well as cattle on the premises
but promised to remove the1n shortly (R. 94, R. 115, R.
135, R. 136). .1\fr. Cumn1ings did not re1nove the sheep

frmn the premises, however (R. 136), and, as 1night be
expected, a conflict concerning the use of the two types
of livestock developed (R. 93). This conflict resulted in
Mr. Marshall advising ~h\ Cununings by letted dated
October 8, 1958, that 1\fr. England 'Was exercising his
option to pay off the smn that :Mr. Cunnnings hadin the
subject ranch propert)' and was read)' and willing to pay
this sun1 at the earliest date provided b)' the terms of
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the agreen1ent (Exhibit 1-P). One of the terms of the
subject contract (Exhibit 7-P) provides for a mutual
option to buy each other out "after 12 months from the
date of execution" (page 3).
On November 19, 1958, respondents exercised their
option to terminate appellants' interest in the contract
for failure of appellants to Inake the payment required
of the1n on October 1, 1958, or withinn the 30-day grace
period. (Exhibit 2-P)
On April 28, 1959, the appellants attempted to exercise their option to buy out respondents' interest in the
subject property (Exhibit 3-P). On May 14, 1959, therespondents exercised their option to buy out the appellants
pursuant to the terms of Exhibit 7-P (Exhibits 4-P and
19-D). On June 26, 1959, the parties agreed to sell the
property involved in this contract to ·the Cottonwood
Stake of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
without prejudice to the rights of either side with respect
to the proceeds resulting from an interiffi division made
by the parties. (Exhibit 25-D)
On July 27, 1959, the property in question was sold
to the Church for the sum of $75,000.00 (R. 66).
On Septen1ber 11, 1959, respondents paid appellants
their share of the property in accordance with the formula
set forth in Exhibit 7-P. (Exhibit 20-D, R. 23).
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STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS

POINT 1.
DEFENDANTS MADE A VALID AND SUFFICIENT
TENDER AND PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFFS TO PURCHASE
THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
POINT 2.
DEFENDANTS WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO PURCHASE THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO
THE OPTION TO DO SO IN 'THEIR CONTRACT AND THE
GRANTING OF AN OPTION BY THE DEFENDANTS TO A
THIRD PARTY TO PURCHASE 'THE ENTIRE INTEREST
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WOULD NOT EFFECT THIS
RIGHT, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.
POINT 3.
PLAINTIFFS FORFEITED THEIR INTERES'T IN THE
CONTRACT OF MAY 7, 1958, BY FAILING TO MAKE THE
PAYMENT DUE THEREUNDER ON OCTOBER 1, 1958, OR
WITHIN THE 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD THEREAFTER.
ARGU~1ENT

POINT 1.
DEFENDANTS MADE A VALID AND SUFFICIENT
TENDER AND PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFFS TO PURCHASE
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THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

In the corresponding point of appellants' brief' it is
contended that the su1n paid by respondents on September 11, 1959, of $1,597.79 was the net payment to the Mills
on the.principal mnount owing out of the down payment
of $3,000.00. This is not correct and the proper amount
found necessary to exercise the option was found by the
court in its memorandum decision. (R. 23) Defendants to
be on the safe side, of course, granted an extra credit
in order to be sure to cmnply with the principle of law
enunciated in the cases set forth on page 9 of appellants'
brief. The real question on this point is whether or not
the sun1 tendered must be the full amount of money necessary to exercise the option according to its terms or
whether it must be this amount plus any other sum that
may be due or

ther~after

found due to the tenderee by the

tenderer for an obligation other than that arising out of
the sun1 due to exercise the option. The Trial Court
deci~ed

that the option in this case required only the pay-

ment of the fonnula set forth in the contract, which is
Exhibit 7-P, and that the terms of the contract governed
the sun1 which respondents were required to tender and
pay to appellants. (R. 31, 32) None of the cases cited by

appellants take the position that all accounts between
the tenderer and tenderee n1ust be paid or offered to be
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paid in order for a valid tender or exercise of an option
to take place.
POINT 2.
DEFENDANTS WERE LEGALLY ENTITLED TO PURCHASE THE INTEREST OF PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO
THE OPTION TO DO SO IN 'THEIR CONTRACT AND THE
GRANTING OF AN OPTION BY THE DEFENDANTS TO A
THIRD PARTY TO PURCHASE 'THE ENTIRE INTEREST
IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WOULD NOT EFFECT THIS
RIGHT, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.

None of the authorities cited by appellants under this
corresponding point are applicable to the facts of this
case because in none of those cases had the tenants in
common contracted for an option whereby either could
buy out the other, as was true in this case. In addition,
the Utah case of Holland v. Morton on which appellants
rely heavily involved a case ·where the highest type of
fiduciary relationship existed between the parties in
which one was acting as the agent and attorney for the
other. In this case, neither party was acting as agent
for the other and the court expressly found that no fiduciary relationship existed between then1 (R. 22, 36).
In the absence of any fiduciary relationship existing
between the parties, it is difficult to understand upon
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what

tlwor~·

appellants contend respondents had any duty

to counnunicate to then1 any indications of an interest
to purchase on behalf of third persons and of their re8ponse thereto, particularly when this occurred after
a thne when respondents would reasonably believe that
tlw interest of the appellants had been forfeited by failure to umke the payu1ent due October 1, 1958, and the
letter written by Attorney

~1:arshall

on thefr behalf sev-

eral months before. At the very least, it should have been
obvious to appellants from Exhibits 1-P and 2-P as early
as the latter part of November, 1958, that respondents intended to acquire the entire interest in this property by
purchase or forfeiture and could not expect to receive
any counnunications that u1ight effect their joint or several interests in this property.
N" owhere in the evidence is there any indication that
the Church paid more than the fair price for the farm

in question. It should have been as apparent to the appellants as to the respondents that the value of the property was greater at the time in question than the sum
necessary to purchase it from the other party, especially
when the appellants were in possession of the property
and the respondents were not, so the failure of respondents to cmnmunicate a particular fact which indicated
that such
mental.

wa~

the case could hardly have been detri-
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In view of the fact that the option right was recriprocal, it is hardly to be expected that one party would communicate all offers to buy at a price in excess of the option price to the other in order to give the other a first
opportunity to buy him out.
The wisdom of such provisions in a contract as the
mutual option here might be questionable, but the party
who comes off second best can hardly expect the court to
re-write the contract for him by alleging that the results
of the "earlier bird getting the worm" are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable.
Equity cannot modify a contract or relieve a party
thereto from contract's provision merely because contract has the effect of placing the party in a less desirable position than he formerly occupied. Chikasaw Lum-

ber Co. v. Kunkel, 183 Old. 347, 82 P.2d 1003.
It is difficult to understand how appellants can contend that any grant of an option on the part of respondents which they did not know about could effect either
parties' legal right to enforce the contract they had
entered into. If appellants atten1pted exercise of the
sarne option (Exhibit 3-P) had not been premature as the
result of this party being 1nistaken

a~

to the date of the

contract which incorporated this right, or if it had oc-
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l\la~·

<'lltTPd

after

tt·tHh·d

~ue<'e~~fully

n·a~on

of the

7, 1959, could respondents have conthat this election had been vitiated by

possibilit~·

that the undisclosed option might

ripen into a contract favorable to

both~

If extrinsic

events, favorabl7' or unfavorable, can so radically alter
the ten11:::; of written agreeinents between parties dealing
at arms length ·with respect to the subject Inatter of
their agremnent, what shall become of the sanetity of
contracts~

POINT 3
PLAINTIFFS FORFEITED THEIR INTEREST IN THE
CONTRACT OF MAY 7, 1958, BY FAILING TO MAKE THE
PAYMENT DUE THEREUNDER ON OCTOBER 1, 1958, OR
WITHIN THE 30-DAY GRACE PERIOD THEREAFTER.

There is no dispute in the evidence that appellants
were obligated to pay the sum of $1,500.00 to Vern and
l(enneth Mills on October 1, 1958, or within 30 days
thereafter (Exhibit 7-P). Appellant Veigh Cumming's
testimony is to the effect that it was only after the receipt
of

~lr.

Marshall's letter of November 19, 1958 (Exhibit

2-P), that he n1ade a tender of the $1,500.00 to Mr. England that he was required to pay on the contract (R. 115).
The lower court excused this default on the ground that
after

~[r.

:Marshall's earlier letter, in which he advised

that respondents were buying out appellants, there could
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be no forfeiture. Certainly, if appellants had ruled upon
this earlier letter, it would be unconscionable to permit
this, but there is no evidence in the record anywhere that
this was the case. Appellants, in their brief (page 7),
now take the position that since the court subsequently
found that they ultimately were entitled to $1,754.11 as
a result of expenditures by appellants for their joint
operations, the payment due on October 1, 1958 need not
have been made.
Even if one party's failure to abide by one section
of a contract could relieve the other party of the sanctions set forth by the agreement for a violation of a different provision, it can readily been seen from Finding
of Fact No. 7 of the Court (R. 34, 35) that $1,771.07 of
the expenses of which one half are chargeable to therespondents were paid after October 1, 1958, so appellants
could not under any theory be excused from paying some
part of the payment due that date.
It is respectfully subn1itted that respondents effectively acquired all of the interests of appellants by exercise of their option as found by the trial court or through
forfeiture of their interest by reason of the non-pay1nent
of the installment due October 1, 1958.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should affinn the judgment of the trial
court and award respondents their costs of court.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

